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Lavey: Innovative Telecommunications Services and the Benefit of the Dou

INNOVATVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES AND THE
BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT
WARREN 0. LAVEYP
INTRODUCTION

Many policy-makers are looking to innovative telecommunications and
telecommunications-based information services1 to foster economic growth,
improve education and health care, and benefit the public. 2 Regulation can spur
or delay such innovation. Unfortunately, well-intentioned regulators too often
impede exciting innovative services when the potential harm to the public
interest from these services is minuscule. Moreover, the potential benefit to the
public interest obtained through the burdens imposed by regulators on the
innovative services is minuscule, too.
This Article analyzes regulatory hurdles to the introduction of innovative
services by telecommunications common carriers. The focus is limited to service
offerings which (1) provide new capabilities to users, and (2) have projected
revenues and costs over the first year that are small for the carriers proposing
these offerings (a "drop in the bucket")? For such services, there should be a
short-term regulatory framework which permits speedy introduction and profit
incentives for successful offerings without substantial cost, time, or disclosure
burdens imposed by regulators. Additionally, there should be a complementary
long-term framework for adjusting the regulation of innovative services that have
successfully grown but do not face substantial competition.
The short-term framework should give the "benefit of the doubt" to the
innovative services. Because of their small revenues and costs for one or more
years after introduction, these services are unable to significantly affect rates for
"basic" telephone services by undermining support mechanisms or by causing or

*
Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Chicago, Illinois. BA, M.S., Harvard
Univ.; Dip. Econ., Cambridge Univ.; J.D., Harvard Law School. Former Assistant to the Chief,
Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission; member of the Illinois Commerce
Commission's Blue Ribbon Panel on regulatory legislation. I am grateful for the assistance of Holly
Rosencranz, Allison Sarelle, and Stephanie Rochelle.
1.
See infra Section IA for a description of some of these innovative services. See also
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 157 (1989) (declaring national policy of
encouraging "the provision of new technologies and services to the public!).
2.
See infra Section IA & notes 13-16.
3.
While a service offering may be small for the carrier proposing it, the offering may be large
relative to a particular market niche. Nevertheless, the regulatory framework developed in this Article
should apply to such an offering. The offering could not have a substantial impact on the carrier's
other services (through cross-subsidies, contributions, or usage diversion). As for protecting the
market niche against anticompetitive practices, rates would have to be above long-run marginal cost,
regulators would quickly check for unlawful practices such as restrictions on resale or bundling, and
there would be opportunities for further review through the complaint process. See infra Section III.
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generating cross-subsidies. If necessary, subsequent prospective adjustments to
cost and revenue allocations could be made for new services that successfully
grow. Under the long-term framework, rates could be adjusted to make
contributions to universal service programs and otherwise to assure just and
reasonable charges. Compared to delaying the introduction of services for
regulatory scrutiny of cost and revenue allocations, this approach would make
the innovative services available to consumers earlier, provide stronger incentives
for carriers to implement innovative services, and give regulators more solid
estimates of costs and demand to determine reasonable long-term rates.
The analysis in this Article is divided into three sections. Section I discusses
innovative services and the types of regulatory obstacles that arise when
regulators try to meet the goals of universal service, reasonable rates, competition, and efficiency. Section II analyzes three recent regulatory decisions (by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission ("NCUC"), Florida Public Service
Commission ("FPSC"), and California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC"))
which impede innovative services, and two decisions by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") which come closer to this Article's approach to
innovative services. Finally, Section HI describes a two-phase regulatory
approach which would promote innovative services while protecting other
regulatory concerns.
I

INNOVATIVE SERVICES AND REGULATORY OBSTACLES

This Section provides background for the analysis of regulatory approaches to
innovative services. Part A describes the types of offerings addressed as "innovative services" in this Article, and Part B addresses the policy concerns that
underlie the regulation of these services and often impede the implementation
of them.
A Desciption of Innovative Services
Telecommunications common carriers have clearly moved beyond providing
only point-to-point voice communications services via wires.4 Recent offerings5
include mobile radio services based on cellular and microcell technologies;
storing and forwarding voice, electronic, and facsimile messages ("mail") through

4.
See, eg., CmZENS LEAGUE, WIRING MINNEsoTA: NEw SrATE GoALs FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3-6 (1989) [hereinafter MINNESOTA REPORT]; RCG/HAGLER, BAILLY, INC., TECOxMMNICA'IONS TECHNOLOGY DPLOYMENT ANALYsTs AND MASTER PLAN DEVELOPM EN, REPORT FOR THE
TENNESSEE PUBUC SERVICE COMMSION I-I, 1-10 (1990) [hereinafter TENNEEE REPORT]; Valovici

ElectronicInformadonServices. The lmpacton CorporateUSers,
tECMMUNICATIONS 51 (Oct. 1990).
5.
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981), nod&fted, 89 F.C.C.2d 58,
further modfifea 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982); Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New
Personal Communications Services, 5 F.C.C. Rcd. 3995 (1990) ("PCS").
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software features in the carriers' computerized switches; 6 two-way interactive
video hook-ups; call forwarding, call waiting, and three-way calling;7 electronic

access to directory and yellow pages listings;8 gateways for interactive computer
services ("rideotext"); 9 and data communications with protocol ("format")

conversions performed by a carrier's switch.10 Many other advanced telecommunications offerings are expected in the near future."
Nationwide, telecommunications common carriers frequentlyrequest authority
from federal and state regulators to introduce innovative services pursuant to a
statute or rule." These innovative services provide new capabilities to users.
They differ from other new offerings which merely reprice the capabilities
offered through existing services, such as volume discounts or different billing
standards (e.g., flat-rate versus measured usage billing, six-second versus

6.
See Expedited Application of Pacific Bell (U 1001 C), a corporation, for Approval of Store
and Forward Service for Facsimiles, Decision 90-07-052 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18,1990) ("PacificBellFax
S/F); Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 1, 81 (Cal. P.U.C., 1989) ("AlternativeRegulatory Frameworks"), modified, Decision 90-04-031
(Cal. P.U.C., Apr. 11, 1990).
7.
See GTE South, Docket No. P-19, Sub. 232 (N.C.U.C., June 8, 1990) (voice messaging
services, including call forwarding-busy and forwarded call information).
8.
See Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Petition for Waiver of Section 69.4(b) of the
Commission's Rules, DA 90-838 (F.C.C., June 15, 1990) (new switched access rate element for an
electronic directory assistance service); US West Communications, Petition for Waiver of Part 69 of
the Commission's Rules to Provide Electronic White Pages Service, DA 90-1203 (F.C.C., Sept. 14,
1990)(same).
9.
See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCHi) 1 67,918, at 57,622
(D.D.C. 1988) (modifying antitrust consent decree to allow the Bell Companies to provide gateways
to improve access to information services and to decrease information storage and transmission costs).
10.
In 1980, the FCC defined basic service as a "pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with customer supplied
information"; an enhanced service "combines basic service with computer processing applications that
act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information." Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387, 420, recon., 84 F.C.C.2d
50 (1980), further recorL, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd sub nom. Computer and Communications
Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cer. denied 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Furnishing of
Enhanced Services and Customer-Premises Equipment by Communications Common Carriers, 47
C.F.R. § 64.702 (1989). As used in this Article, innovative services include basic as well as enhanced
services offering users new capabilities.
11.
See generally National Telecommunications and Information Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Comprehensive Study of Domestic Telecommunications Infrastructure, 55 Fed. Reg. 800 (Jan.
9, 1990) [hereinafter NTIA]; PACIFIC BELL'S RESPONSE TO THE INTLLIGENT NETWoRK TASK FORCE
REPORT (1987); Lavey, Universal TelecommunicationsInfrasucturefor Information Services, 42 FED.
CoMM. .J. 151, 152 (1990).
12.
See ag., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 213 para. 13-501 (Smith-Hurd 1988) ("No telecommunications carrier shall offer or provide telecommunications service unless and until a tariff is filed with
the Commission which describes the nature of the service, applicable rates and other charges, terms
and conditions of service.. . 2); PacificBell Fax S/F,Decision 90-07-052 at 20 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18,
1990) C'As a condition on any grant of authority to offer FAX S/F service, Pacific should be required
to file a FAX S/F tariff by advice letter pursuant to General Order 96-A, which will not take effect
without Commission approval.").
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one-minute billing increments). 3 Although repriced offerings often provide
benefits to consumers, they involve different issues than services with new
capabilities. The recommendations in this Article are limited in application to
offerings providing new capabilities to users.
Typically, innovative services are introduced amidst great uncertainty about the
demand and costs for the service, and the features necessary to make the services
attractive. These uncertainties make it difficult to develop rates through a
formula based on expected costs and demand. 14 Furthermore, pricing flexibility-upward as well as downward-for innovative services is necessary for
carriers to respond to emerging market conditions. Unforeseen costs, competitive substitutes, customer acceptance difficulties or ease, etc., could warrant price
adjustments. Regulatory constraints on price changes in the early phases of
innovative services deter carriers from investing in the facilities and marketing
the services.
Policy-makers point to innovative telecommunications and telecommunications-based information services as key to regional economic growth as well
as to United States competitiveness in the world economy.' Furthermore,
these new services are viewed as critical to the delivery of education, health care,
public safety, and other quality of life enhancements. 6
Some regulators, including FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes, and other experts,
have expressed concern about the slow introduction of innovative services in the
13. See Private Line Rate Structure and Volume Discount Practices,
97 F.C.C.2d 923, 948
(1984); Guidelines for Dominant Carriers' MTS Rates and Rate Structure Plans, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,945
(Oct. 23, 1985), 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 70 (1985) (optional toll calling plans) C'Optional Calling
Plan?); Investigation of Experimental Extended Measured Service, 111 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
252 (Mo. P.S.C., 1990); Investigation of Providing Extended Area Service (EAS) for the Exchanges
of Spirit Lake and Bayview/Athol and Examining the Current Rate Structure of Toll-PAC Service of
GTE Northwest, Inc., Case No. GTE-T-89-7, Order No. 23095 (Idaho P.U.C., 1990) (optional
discounted toll plans); Notice and Application of South Central Bell Telephone Company for
Adoption and Implementation of a Rate Stabilization Plan for its Mississippi Operations, Order,
89-UN-5453 NF89-149 (Miss. P.S.C., 1980) (optional area calling plan); Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 70-72 (approving expansion of local calling areas from
eight to twelve miles).
The distinction in this Article between "innovative' and other new services differs from the FCC's
distinction between "new" and "restructured" services in a recent proceeding. According to the FCC:
an offering increasing customer options should be classified as new, while an offering
that represents a change in an existing method of charging or provisioning, without
increasing the range of alternatives, should be classified as restructured....
A new service may, but need not, include a new technology or new functional capability.
Many new services are, in essence, repriced versions of already existing services.
M..
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C. Red. 2873, 3116, 3123 n.1103
(1989) C(FCc Price Caps"). See infra Section ILD.
14. For discussion of reasonable rates, see Section 1.B, infira.
15.
See NTLA, supra note 11, at 804-05; MIcHIGAN GOVERNOR'S TELECOMuNICAnON TASK
FORCE, CONNCnON. A STRATEGY FOR MICHtGAN'S FUTURE THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS at 13

(May 1990); NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION ADM[N., U.S. DEPtr oF COMMERCE,
NTIA TaECOM 2000: ClIARTING THE COURSE FOR A NEw CEmuIRY 57-61 (1988) [hereinafter NTIA

TEfLECOM 2000]; Lavey, supra note 11, at 158-69.
16. See NTIA, supra note 11, at 805-06; NTIA TELECOM 2000, supra note 15, at 99-113.
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United States and the consequent harm to the United States economy, society,
and residents.1 7 Major regulatory changes, including replacing traditional
rate-base/rate-of-return regulation with earnings incentives (such as price caps),
are aimed at spurring carriers to introduce innovative services and to invest in
advanced network capabilities.1 8
There are many companies which provide types of telecommunications-based
information services, such as databases on publicly traded corporate securities
and shop-at-home services.' 9 Most of these firms are not regulated by state
public utility commissions or the FCC, and are not affiliated with regulated
telecommunications common carriers. Nevertheless, regulated common carriers
play a unique and important role in developing innovative telecommunications
services and making them universally available. The regulated common carriers
include: (1) local exchange telephone companies ("LECs") which operate largely
as franchised monopolies; (2) cellular radio carriers which hold one of two FCC
licenses to serve specified areas using certain radio spectrum; and (3) interexchange carriers ("IXCs"), the largest being American Telephone and Telegraph
Company ("AT&T), which is regulated as a dominant carrier by the FCC and
many states.20 Section LB, which follows, explains some of the regulatory
policies affecting these carriers' ability to provide innovative services.
One final note in this description of innovative services is that a few of the
newer services are more controversial than the vast bulk of innovative services.
The privacy concerns surrounding caller identification service (whereby the
number of the calling line is displayed on the called party's terminal equipment)
is one example of a highly controversial service. 2' The regulatory approach

17.

See Remarks of Alfred Sikes Before the 1990 Regulatory Summit (Apr. 25, 1990); Sikes,

Statement on Proposed Legislation to Change the Manufacturing, Information Services, and
Jurisdictional Provisions of the AT&T Consent Decree (Mar. 7, 1990); Remarks of Alfred Sikes
before the Columbia Institute Conference on High Technology and the Future of American Economy
(Sept. 11, 1989) (available at the California Western Law Review office); Remarks of FCC
Commissioner Sherrie Marshall: Huck Fmn and the Intelligent Network (June 25, 1990); Should the
U.S. Free the Baby Bells?, Bus. W&, Mar. 12,1990, at 118; NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LNFRASrRUCTuRE, PRODUCTIVITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Apr.
9, 1990); DARBY ASSOCIATES, CAPiTAL-FORMATION IN U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS (May 24, 1990).

18.
FCC Price Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 2923; Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant
Carriers, Second Report and Order, F.C.C. 90-314, at 16-17 (released Oct. 4, 1990) C(LEC Price

Caps') CWe do not subscribe to the view... that our rate of return system necessarily discourages
innovation. Our view is that rate of return does not provide sufficient incentives for broad
innoyations in the way firms do business. Incentive regulation, by creating incentives for carriers to

become more productive, generates powerful motives to innovate, and is a better way of regulating.").
19. E.g., Journal Phone (a service of Dow Jones & Co., Inc.), Prodigy (a service of International Business Machines Corp. and Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc.), and Nexis (a service of Mead Data

Corp.).
20.

See Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 5 F.C.C. Red. 2627, 2628

(1990) ("AT&TRuleaking); AT&T Communications of Michigan, Inc., Case No. U-9327 (Mich.
P.S.C., Sept. 26, 1989) (denying request for streamlined regulation for AT&T equivalent to
nondominant facilities-based interexchange carriers).

21.

See Barasch v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., Pa. Commonw. Ct. Nos. 2270 C.D. 1989, 2268 C.D.

1989, 2324 C.D. 1989, 2371 C.D. 1989, Opinion (filed May 30, 1990) (holding that caller

identification service is an unlawful trap-and-trace device under Pennsylvania statutes); Proceeding
on Motion of the Commission to Review Issues Concerning Privacy in Telecommunications, Notice

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 1, Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

described in Section III would give regulators the opportunity to impose
appropriate delays in the introduction of the few innovative services raising such
controversial and novel issues. Additionally, some innovative services will
encounter delays, not because of their proposed capabilities, but because these
services depend on new allocations of radio spectrum.2z The regulatory
approach described in this Article does not deal with spectrum allocations.
B. Policy Concerns
Regulators consider many policies when reviewing an innovative service
proposed by a regulated common carrier. This discussion, however, is limited
to four principal policies that affect such reviews: universal service, reasonable
rates, competition, and efficiency. Unfortunately, when well-intentioned
regulators pursue these policies, they often impose on innovative services
unnecessary cost, time, and disclosure burdens which are contrary to the public
interest.
1. UniversalService. Federal and state regulators, pursuant to explicit statutory
goals 3 or regulatory interpretation of the "public interest," attempt to promote
the widespread availability of telephone service (typically measured in terms of
percentage of households with local telephone service).24 These efforts usually
entail two broad programs as well as one narrow program.
One of the broad programs involves charging all residential subscribers low
("affordable") local service rates.2s Under this program, residential subscribers
pay far less than business subscribers for local service, and toll services pay for
a substantial share of the transmission and switching network used jointly to
provide local and toll services. The second broad program supports local and

Requesting Comments, Case 90-C-0075 (N.Y.P.S.C., Jan. 31, 1990); Calling Number Delivery,

Request by Joseph Baer for Rulemaking inOrder to Establish Uniform, Nationwide Rules for Calling

Number Delivery, Notice of Petition for Rulemaking, RM-7397 (F.C.C., June 18, 1990).
22.
National Telecommunications and Information Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Comprehensive Policy Review of Use andManagementof the Radio Frequency Spectrum, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,694
(Dec. 8, 1989) [hereinafter NTIA Spectrum Review]. See also supra notes 3 & 5.
23.
47 U.S.C. §151'(1989) (declaring national policy "to make available, so far as possible, to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges"); Lavey, supra note 11, at 155
n.11.
24. See Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 46-47 ("our
universal service goal has been to maintain affordable rates for basic service, high levels of customer
penetration for connections to the local telephone network, and availability of high quality services");
STAFF OF THE FEDERAL-STATE JoINT BOARD, MowrroRNG REPORT, CC Docket No. 80-286, at 10-11
(July 1990) [hereinafter MONrroRING REPORT]; NTIA, supra note 11, at 816-18; NTIA TELECOM 2000,
supra note 15, at 78-82; Lavey, supra note 11, at 154-55.
25. See Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 47 ("Our
regulatory policy has been to make low basic service rates possible historically by pricing other
services such as toll rates and, more recently, access charges significantly above cost."); Lavey, The
PublicPoliciesthat Changed the Telephone Industry into RegulatedMonopolies: Lessonsfrom Around
1915, 39 FED. Comm. LJ. 171, 175-76, 189-90 (1987) [hereinafter Franchises].
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toll service rates in high cost, typically rural areasOas Since most toll rates are
geographically averaged and many toll-access rates are pooled and supported
across geographic areas,2 toll services pay for a large share of network costs in
high-cost areas. The narrow program makes lower initial connection rates and
local service rates available to low-income people based on criteria approved by
both federal and state regulators, and with funding from both interstate and
intrastate services.u
These programs operate through funds or pools which allocate costs and
revenues among telecommunications services, customer groups, carriers, and
areas. Carriers charge higher rates for certain telecommunications services (e.g.,
toll services or local services other than basic residential), and use these revenues
to support the low rates for some other services. The amount of contribution
to the universal service programs varies from service to service and usually is not
clearly identified.
Various methods are used to arrive at rate designs for services with rates
supported by universal service programs, and for services with rates contributing
to such support. These methods include rules for allocating costs and revenues,
explicit surcharges, and setting rates for local residential service to cover a
residual revenue requirement.29
Regulators often scrutinize rates for innovative services to determine whether
they make an "adequate" contribution to the universal service programs. 30 Yet,
what constitutes an adequate contribution is seldom based on well-established
standards. Moreover, given the price elasticity of demand for innovative services

26.

Franchises,supranote 25, at 174-75, 187-89; 47 C.F.R. §§ 36.601-41, 69.116 (1989) (high

cost fund); 47 C.F.R. §§ 6 9 .2 (y), 69.612(a) (1989) (long-term support); MONrrORING REPORT, supra
note 24, at 96-99. These programs funded by revenues from telecommunications services are supple-

mented by the federal Rural Electrification Administration telephone loan programs. Lavey, supra
note 11, at 173-74.

27.

See AT&TRulemaking, 5 F.C.C. Red. at 2649; FCCPriceCaps, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 3132-34;

Tariff Filings by Raleigh/Durham MSA, Fayetteville MSA, United Telespectrum, and Centel Cellular

Company to Establish Rates for Wide Area Call Reception, Docket No. P-100, Sub. 109, Order
Denying Motion for Reconsideration at 5 (E.N.C.U.C., Oct. 10, 1990) C'WACR Recon. OrdeD
C'[Tlhere is a complex web of cross-support in telecommunications. The LECs assist each other in
meeting the universal service goal through uniform tariffs and intraLATA pooling.

The IXCs

contribute through access charges.').
28.
As of July 1990, forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were
participating in some type of federal lifeline assistance program for low-income people. MoNtrOING
REPORT,

supranote 24, at 54-59. See also 47 C.F.R. § 69.117 (1990); Amendment of Part 69 of the

Commission's Rules Relating to the Assessment of Charges for the Universal Service Fund and
Lifeline Assistance, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 6134 (1989); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Amendment of
Part 67 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, Recommended Decision and
Order, 2 F.C.C. Red. 2324 (1987), Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. Red. 2953 (1987), Memorandum
Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Order Inviting Comments, 3 F.C.C. Red. 4543 (1988).
See also Establishment of Telephone Lifeline Rates for all Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the

State of Utah, Case No. 85-999-13 (Utah P.S.C., Dec. 17, 1986, rehg denied Feb. 4, 1987).
29. Residual ratemaking sets rates for one service based not on costs that are allocated to that

service by some methodology, but rather on the carder's total revenue requirement minus its revenues
from other services. If rates for the other services are set to generate support for the residuallypriced service, the latter's rate is often below the level indicated by some cost methodologies.

30.

See infra Section IIA
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(which is probably much higher than that of basic local service), a larger
contribution suppresses demand for the innovative services'
This inquiry
often leads to speculative estimates of calling volumes diverted to the innovative
service from other services that make high or low contributions to these
programs.'
Also, universal service goals frequently lead regulators to require that can-iers
make their innovative services available to a wide range of subscribers at the
same time, or soon after they are introduced. While in the long run, such
requirements may be necessary to maximize network efficiency and social
welfare,33 in the short run, such requirements can impede experimentation with
innovative servicesY4
2. Reasonable Rates. In addition to the effects of new rates on universal
service programs, carriers must show that new rates satisfy statutory
standards-generally, rates must be "just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. "3S
Rates must not be so low as to require cross-subsidie (except when warranted
by goals such as universal service) or be anticompetitive ("predatory")Y7 Nor
should consumers receiving a service be required to pay unreasonably high rates.
But, as discussed above,-s some rates are set high enough to generate support
for other rates. Additionally, regulators often examine the discriminatory effect
of offerings with different rates for different subscribers, or even the same rate

31.
See infra Section II.C.
32. See infra Section II.A.
33. See MINNESOTA REPORT, supranote 4, at 39 (recommending that the Minnesota legislature
"[a]dopt a state telecommunications policy calling for the completion of an advanced technology,
broadband telecommunications network throughout the state by the year 2005'); TENNEsSEE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 1-12 (recommending full, rapid deployment in rural as well as urban counties of
intelligent network, integrated services and broad-band capabilities).
34. See Lavey, supra note 11, at 161 & n31 (FCC allowed the Bell Operating Companies to
introduce Open Network Architecture offerings initially in selected areas, with a schedule for phased
introduction of capabilities throughout a carrier's geographic service area. This approach is designed
to avoid possibly inefficient investments in a new, unproven architecture where massive introduction
is neither necessary or desirable.).
35.
See, eg., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a); ILL ANN. STAT., ch. 111 2/3, paras. 9-101, 9-241
(Smith-Hurd 1988); Western Union Int'l, Inc. v. FCC, 568 F.2d 1012, 1018 (2d Cir. 1977), cen
denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); American Trucking Ass'n v. FCC, 377 F.2d 121, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
car. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967); Long-Run Regulation of AT&T's Basic Domestic Interstate
Services, 95 F.C.C.2d 510, 517-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
36. Standards for cross-subsidy often are vague, can differ substantially, and generally depend
on arbitrary cost allocations. See Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization:Pricingin PublicEnterprises,65 AM.
ECON. REV. 966 (1975); Larson, Monson & Nobles, CompetitiveNecessity andPricinginTelecommunications Regulation, 42 FED. CoiM. L-I. 1, 12-18 (1989).
37. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sheman Act, 88 HARV. L REV. 697 (1975); Larson, Monson & Nobles, supra note 36, at 18-20;
Larson & Sievers, On the Ineffectiveness of Price Floors in Telecommunications Regulation, 25
Wlt.AM n' L. REV. 89 (1989).
38. See supra Section I.B.1.
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for different subscribers.
The most common approach used to determine whether new rates are
reasonable involves forecasts of costs and demand. Cost-justifying rates requires
determining the costs caused by an innovative service (incremental or marginal
costs) and typically the share of the carrier's common costs that should be
covered by the service according to prescribed accounting procedures (which
include arbitrary allocations of common or overhead costs))Q The forecasts of
costs and demand as well as the cost allocations are usually fertile ground for
manipulation, disputes, and delays.4' Opponents to a tariff filing for an
innovative service (often competitors or users of other services) can allege that
the filing carrier allocated costs caused by the innovative service to basic services,
failed to cover a fair share of common costs, did not impute costs applicable to
competitors, or derived a low rate by overstating likely demand.
Some cost allocation methods assign such high costs to innovative services
that, in light of their price elasticity of demand caused by competition or the
"discretionary' (non-essential) nature of the offering, any prospects for their
success in the marketplace are reduced. Thus, carriers have little incentive to
undertake the investment risk to introduce them. Similarly, some rate regulation
effectively imposes a low ceiling but no floor on the carrier's potential earnings
from innovative services. Under this type of regulation, high earnings from an
innovative service lead regulators to decrease rates for basic services; thus, the
innovative services earnings do not raise the carrier's total earnings. In contrast,
regulators may shield ratepayers from the impact of unsuccessful innovative
services and require the carrier's shareholders to bear associated costs.
Subsequent regulatory adjustments may disallow losses from an unsuccessful
innovative service from costs covered by basic services as not "used and useful"
investments and expenditures. Consequently, innovative services might instead
lower the carrier's total earnings.
At a minimum, the carrier must prepare expensive and time-consuming studies
for review by regulators. Often, regulatory filing requirements force carriers to
reveal sensitive competitive information. Less regulated competitors may not

39.

Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1982); AT&T

Communications, Revisions to Tariff FCC No. 12, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 4932 (1989), recon. 4 F.C.C. Red.

7928 (1989).
40.
See Kahn & Shew, CurrentIssues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 YALE J.

REG. 191, 219-20 (1987); J.BONBRIGHT, A. DANiELSEN & D. KAMEmCHEN, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLc
UTLTY RATES 109-23 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter J. BoNBPIGHr]; A. KAHN, 1 TIE ECONOMICS OF
REGULA'noN at 79 (2ded. 1988); AT&T, Manual and Procedures for Allocation of Costs, 86 F.C.C.2d
667 (1981), aff'd sub nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 675 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
41.
See, eg, AT&T Communications, Inc., Revisions of Tariff F.C.C. Nos. 260,266,267,268,
270, 273 and 274 to Establish Rates and Regulations for ACCUNET Packet Service, 101 F.C.C.2d

144, 165, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1503, 1506-07 (1984) (1985) (rhe prospect that eventual demand
increases will recoup the interim revenue foregone by discounted rates is too speculative to support
preferential pricing. . . .'); AT&T Communications, Inc., Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. Nos. 4, 9 and 10
(ACCUNET Packet Service), Mimeo No 3264 at 1 69 (Mar. 25, 1986) (while AT&T's demand
projections seemed overly optimistic, "anyattempt to anticipate the accuracy of competing projections

would be an exercise more speculative than useful), 2 F.C.C. Red. 588, 590 (1987); 2 F.C.C. Rd.
5231 (1987).
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have to make such detailed, public ffiings. 42 Accordingly, regulation may
deprive certain carriers of a headstart and other market advantages they deserve
because of their investment in research, development, and marketing. As a
result, highly regulated carriers will be less likely to invest in new technologies.
Recently, regulatory commissions have adopted methods of rate regulation
which depart from traditional cost analysis. 40 These regulatory reforms
recognize the benefits of giving carriers some pricing flexibility, streamlining the
burdens of rate regulation for regulators and carriers, and replacing cost-plus
regulation with profit incentives for efficiency and innovation.
3. Competition. Federal and state regulators embrace competition, in at least
some telecommunications offerings, as a tool to promote low rates and high
quality under certain market conditions." The level of competition in distinct
telecommunications services varies and depends on both regulatory decisions and
underlying economics.
Several examples illustrate regulatory reactions to competition. Competition
is intense in most geographic areas for customer premises ("terminal")
equipment, many information ("enhanced") services,45 and paging services.
Although AT&T faces strong competition in many long distance services, it has
the largest market share, and some operational, marketing, and cost advantages
derived from its historic monopolyPosition, as well as special service and rate
obligations imposed by regulators.4 In cellular radio services, the FCC has
established a duopoly in each service area, with regulators generally treating each
As a final illustration, state
carrier as facing substantial competition.47
legislation and regulation generally authorize only one local exchange service

42.

See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and

Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1980) C'[S]ignificant costs... are inflicted on
society by the loss of dynamism which can result from regulation.... Effective competition is clearly
curtailed when firms are required to give advance notice of innovative marketing plans and have those

initiatives be subject to public comment and regulatory review.).
43.
See infra Section ILD. for a discussion of the FCC's regulation of AT&T using price caps.
See, ag., REGULATORY R.sEARcH ASSOCIATES, INC., STATE ThECOMMiUNICAIONs-ALTERNAIVE
RAmtSANG PLANS, REGULATORY Focus (Feb. 21,1990); FCCPrice Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 2881
('price caps represent a regulatory approach that is superior to rate of return because price caps are

better suited to encouraging efficiency and innovation in the provision of services .... '); Application
of Wisconsin Bell, Inc. for an Investigation of Its Proposed Rates and Tariffs, Docket 6720-TR-10
4 (Vis. P.S.C., Sept. 5,1990) ("Wisconsin Bel'); Review of Financial Data as Filed by Wisconsin Bell
Inc., 32-34, 6720-TI-102 (Wis. P.S.C., June 15, 1990); Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 167 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 116; Promulgating an Experimentat Plan for the Optional Regulation of
Telephone Companies, Case No. PUC880035 (Va. P.U.C., Dec. 15, 1988); Generic Proceeding to
Consider Intrastate Incentive Regulation, Docket No. 90-266-C, Order No. 90-849, at 5-8 (S.C. P.S.C.,
Sept. 5,1990). See also Lavey & Gavillet, RegulationofSmall Exchange Telephone Companies:Lighter

Burdens in 17 States, 6 TEEMATICS 1-6 (Jan. 1989).
44. See NTIA, supra note 11, at 814; FCCPrice Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 2887-88.
45. See supra Section IA & note 8.
46.
See AT&TRulemakdng, 5 F.C.C. Red. 2627.
47.
See Cellular Lottery Rulemaking, 98 F.C.C.2d 175 (1984), recon., 101 F.C.C.2d 577, 58
Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 677 (1985); Cellular Radiotelephone Utilities, Decision 90-06-025 (Cal. P.U.C.,

June 6, 1990); CEM.LUA. TELEOMMtJNICATMoNS
REGULATORY UPDATE (May 1990).

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,
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provider for residential subscribers in each service area.
This scenario of varying levels of competition has two implications for the
regulation of innovative services. For those services that face or could face
competition in the future, the question is whether the rates are anticompetitively
low. Regulators are concerned about carriers cross-subsidizing competitive
services by shifting costs to, or revenues from, their monopoly services. Also,
in offering competitive or potentially competitive services, is the carrier taking
advantage of any monopoly facilities or services in'ways or at rates that are not
available to its competitors? Although it is subject to reconsideration following
an appellate court reversal, the FCCs Third ComputerInquiry with its rules for
Comparably Efficient Interconnection and Open Network Architecture illustrates
this concern.49

Again, these competitive concerns can often delay or deter the implementation
of innovative services. Justifying their actions in terms of competitive concerns,
regulators often raise the rates of a heavily-regulated carrier for an innovative
service, delay its introduction, obtain information about the carrier's costs and
related market studies, thus reducing the carrier's headstart advantages.
4. Efficiency. As a fourth major policy goal, regulators promote efficient use
of telecommunications facilities and services.5 Efficiency leads to lower rates,
wider availability of telecommunications capabilities, better service quality, and
greater use of the scarce radio spectrum.
Concerns about efficiency often lead regulators to review the planned use of
transmission and switching facilities network configurations for innovative
services.51 In particular, regulators are concerned about "uneconomic bypass"
whereby a service utilizes one configuration of facilities and services instead of
a second, even though the latter has lower underlying network costs.52 The

48.

FCC Price Caps, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2939-43; Lavey & Carlton, Economic Goals and

Remedies of the AT&T Modified FinalJudgment, 71 GEo. LJ. 1497, 1508-12 (1983).

49.

In deciding to replace requirements of structural separation between basic and enhanced

services with nonstructural safeguards, the FCC required the Bell Operating Companies to tariff
unbundled basic service capabilities and to use these tariffed capabilities for their own enhanced

services. Amendment of Sec. 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer
Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) ("Phase I Order), 2 F.C.C. Red. 3035 (1987) ('Phase I Recon.

Order'), 3 F.C.C. Red. 1135 (1988) ("Phase I FurtherRecon. Order), 2 F.C.C. Rd. 3072 (1987)

C'PhaseII Ordee), 3 F.C.C. Red. 1150 ('PhaseJlRecon. Order), 4 F.C.C. Red. 5927 (1989) ("Phase
I Second FurtherRecon. Orderand Phase IFurtherRecon. Order"), rev'd inpartssub nom. California

v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Computer III Remand Proceedings, F.C.C. 90-283 (released
Aug. 6, 1990). See also Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 1198-99 (1984) (Fifth Report and

Order) (nonstructural safeguards for LECs to offer interexchange services).
50.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1989) (declaring national policy to make available efficient communication service). See generally NTIA Spectrum Review, supra note 22; PCS, 5 F.C.C. Red. at 3995.
51.
See infra Section II.A.
52.
See, eg, MONrrORwG REPORT, supra note 24, at 316-26; Provision of Competitive
Telecommunications Services, 97 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 432, 444-47 (Me. P.U.C., 1988);

Telephone Services that Bypass Local Exchange or Toll Networks, 70 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1
(N.Y.P.S.C., 1985), affid, 73 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 1 (N.Y.P.S.C., 1986); Investigation into
Effects of Competition Upon Local and Toll Exchange Service, 54 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 175,
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choice may be distorted when regulatory decisions set the rate for using the
latter far above its costs or restrict the capabilities offered through that
configuration of facilities and services.
A regulatory decision barring provision of the innovative service via a
configuration utilizing uneconomic bypass can promote efficient usage of existing
networks and maintain support for universal service programs. However, such
a decision can delay the introduction of, boost the cost of, and consequently
suppress demand for, an innovative service which would benefit subscribers.
Also, such routing may impair the quality of the innovative service by delaying
connections and increasing the likelihood of blocked calls or noise. These
regulatory actions require difficult, expensive, and time-consuming analyses of
network facilities and the use of various configurations.
In many cases, the goal of efficiency works in unison with the goals of
universal service, reasonable rates, and competition. However, Section II, which
follows, will illustrate that some innovative services create a conflict among these
regulatory concerns.
II.

ILLUSTRATIVE REGULATORY OBSTACLES IMPEDING INTRODUCTION OF
INNOVATIVE SERVICES

This Section examines four types of regulatory obstacles to innovative services:
(A) restrictions on the availability of, and the allocations of costs to, wide area
cellular service by the NCUC; (B) rate regulation and revenue allocations for
voice mail and other information services by the FPSC; (C) pricing of touch-tone
service by the CPUC; and (D) rate regulation in the context of price caps by the
FCC. These obstacles illustrate the need for a streamlined short-term regulatory
framework as well as possible regulatory adjustments in the long-term framework
described in Section III.
A Wide Area CellularService in North Carolina
The NCUC dealt with an innovative cellular service known as "wide area call
reception" ("WACR") in May 1990.3 A form of call forwarding or automatic
call routing,' this service allows callers to reach cellular subscribers by calling
their regular local cellular numbers even when the cellular subscribers are
traveling outside of their local service areas. A cellular carrier's switches, in
effect, find a called party for the caller by searching multiple service areas or by

182 (Cal. P.U.C., 1983).
53.
Tariff Filings by Raleigh/Durham MSA, Fayetteville MSA, United TeleSpectrum, and
Centel Cellular Company to Establish Rates for Wide Area Call Reception, Docket No. P-109, Sub.
109 (N.C.U.C., May 11, 1990) C'WACR Orde"), WACR Recon. Order, Docket P-100, Sub. 109

(E.N.C.U.C., Oct. 10, 1990).
54. See United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., Civ. No. 82-0192 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12,1990)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, dist. file) (allowing Bell Companies to provide cellular services with
automatic call routing on a limited geographic basis).
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reference to a database which stores information on where the subscriber is
located. This new service provides convenience for calling and called parties,
and also increases network efficiency by eliminating a caller's multiple calls to
different service areas in trying to reach a cellular subscriber.
Operationally, a cellular carrier proposed to provide WACR by carrying the
calls directly between the cellular switches, such as by a microwave link. Under
this configuration, a cellular-to-cellular call would not use an LEC's services, and
a landline-to-cellular call would use an LEC's services on only one end. Prior
to this service, the NCUC required that calls between cellular service areas be
routed via a traditional IXC ("landline"). This indirect routing was often
inefficient (utilizing more transmission and switching facilities than WACR's
direct routing between cellular switches) and reduced the quality of transmission
(in terms of longer time to establish a connection, higher probability of blocking,
and more noise). But, IXCs' toll services contributed heavily to universal service
programs by paying LECs'access charges and using LECs'access services on
both the originating and terminating ends of a long distance call. By requiring
cellular carriers to use IXCs, which in turn paid LECs these high access charges,
regulators guaranteed that landline-to-cellular, cellular-to-landline, and cellularto-cellular calls also contributed to universal service programs through payment
of access charges to LECs on both ends.
In the NCUC proceeding, cellular carriers argued that they should be able to
offer WACR with direct routing and to limit the charges paid to LECs to the
economic cost of the interconnected services actually provided by LECs to
cellular carriers. 55 Also, cellular carriers asserted that imposing higher charges
on their innovative service would suppress demand and impair the viability of the
service. 6 In contrast to the small expected usage and revenue of WACR, the
57
landline services that contribute to universal service programs were large
Thus, cellular carriers argued that WACR would not divert a noticeable amount
of usage or revenues, if any, from services that support these programs ss at
least in its initial year.
After a year of regulatory delay following the carrier's tariff filing, the NCUC
approved WACR, but limited it to a narrow geographic area and imposed
surcharges on the service to support universal service programs. Predictably, the
delay and disclosures of information during the course of this proceeding
eliminated many of the headstart advantages for the cellular carrier who
developed this innovative service.59
Stating its policy of promoting new telecommunications capabilities, the
NCUC concluded that "WACR represents a natural, perhaps inevitable,

55. HearingIn the Matter of General/Telephone Mide Area CallReception, Docket No. P-100,
Sub. 109, vol. 1, at 87 (N.C.U.C., Nov. 28, 1989).
56. Id. at 87.
57. Id. at 87-88.
58. Id. at 82.
59. As noted in Section I.B3, supra, the FCC has granted cellular licenses to two competing
firms in each geographic service area.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1990

13

California Western Law Review, Vol. 27 [1990], No. 1, Art. 4

CAL FoRNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2"7

technological and structural evolution by which calling parties can obtain more
expeditious access to called parties over a wider calling area. "6° However, the
NCUC refused to treat WACR as what it was, an innovative service sure to
remain small during its first year and of somewhat doubtful viability. Instead,
the NCUC envisioned WACR as part of a vast "conceivable (but by no means
certain or imminent) future development that could undermine the viability of
the universal service programs and landline carriers.
While WACR represents a technological advance, from another
perspective it can be viewed simply as a more sophisticated method
by which a cellular company can offer long distance service....
It is certainly conceivable that as the costs to cellular companies
decline and the cost of cellular telephones continues to decrease,
cellular companies will increasingly compete with [IXCs] for toll
calls.6'
Based on this vision of WACR as a large service diverting many calls from
landline IXCs, the NCUC required that WACR make contributions to support
universal service programs comparable to those of landline IXCs using the LEC's
access services on both ends of a call. The NCUC initially even required
contributions from cellular-to-cellular calls that do not interconnect with the
landline network,62 but on reconsideration decided not to impose this charge
pending future examination.63
On the surface, these charges appear to foster fair competition between
cellular carriers and IXCs, as well as stable universal service programs. Yet, the
charges and the associated regulatory proceedings suppressed demand for and
delayed a service that, without a doubt, did not threaten universal service or the
viability of landline carriers over its first or second years in the market.
Moreover, these charges could not significantly contribute to universal service
programs during the WACR's initial years.
A better approach would have been to grant cellular carriers broad authority
to offer telecommunications services, and to allow expeditious introduction of
WACR with payments to landline carriers covering the economic costs of
interconnections for WACR. Using this approach would have avoided concerns
about cross-subsidies from landline services to WACR without imposing
impediments to the availability and success of an innovative service. Also, this
approach would not cause any noticeable harm to the universal service programs,
the viability of landline carriers, or competition during this initial period. If
WACR grew into the substantial force in the marketplace that the NCUC found

60.
61.
62.
63.

WACR Order, Docket No. P-100, Sub. 109 at 5 (N.C.U.C., May 11, 1990).
Id. at 5-6, 10.

Id. at 9.
WACR Recon. Order,Docket P-100, Sub. 109 at 5 (E.N.C.U.C., Oct. 10, 1990).
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"conceivable," prospective adjustments to rates (imposition of access charges)
could have been made through subsequent regulatory proceedings. This is the
approach that the NCUC took, on reconsideration, to imposing access charges
on cellular-to-cellular calls. 4 Cellular carriers would be on notice that the
NCUC might impose such charges in the future, thereby reducing the probability
that the carriers would construct uneconomic bypass facilities based on the
assumption that services using such configurations would permanently avoid
contribution to universal service programs.
B. Information Services in Florida

In September 1989, the FPSC ordered that LEC-provided information
services6s are subject to full tariff regulation." The tariff regulation may
involve expensive studies and lengthy disputes over whether rates cover a "full
share" of a carrier's common costs, and whether rates are nondiscriminatory or
anticompetitive. This FPSC decision was part of a proceeding designed to guide
the orderly, efficient introduction and evolution of information services.6
While the FPSC held that it had jurisdiction to regulate some other types of
information services providers," it imposed such tariff regulation only on
LEC-provided information services.
The FPSC's decision to regulate LEC-provided information services was based
on three findings. 69 First, since the market for information services is competi-

tive, but still in its infancy, the FPSC assumed that a competitive market would

64. Id ("[I]f in the future the growth of this type of case results in a genuine threat to the loss
of revenues to the LECs and to universal service and evidence is presented to the Commission to that
effect, the issue may be re-examined.").
65.
The FPSC found that it could not define information services precisely, and would proceed
on a case-by-case basis. An Investigation into the Statewide Offering of Access to the Local Network
for the Purpose of Providing Information Services, Order No. 21815 at 12 (F.P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1989)
C'Florida Orde). The FPSC cited:
a vast array of services that use the telecommunications system to transmit information or, that
enhance, modify, or redirect transmissions in ways not directly related to telephonic transmission. These services take various forms including telephone answering services, data base
retrieval, value-added networks and other services oriented towards the storage manipulation and
transmittal of information-either voice or data.
Id. at 6. The FPSC's order was based on the assumption that the FCC lacked the authority to
preempt state regulation of LEC-provided enhanced services which originate and terminate in the
same state. The FCC had preempted state regulation of enhanced services, but this preemption was
reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals after the FPSC's order. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d
1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. FlordaOrder, Order No. 21815 at 49 (F.P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1989).
67. Id at 8. See also supra Section I.B.2 and 3.
68. F/oridaOrder, Order No. 21815 at 17-18 (F.P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1989).
69. Id. at 8.
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make information services available rapidly and efficiently. 70 Competition
depends on non-LEC providers which usually rely on LEC basic transmission
services. The FPSC reasoned that, although non-LEC providers of information
services do not deserve to be "protected" from competition by regulators,
regulators should not allow LECs to disrupt the existence and growth of
non-LEC providers.7'
Second, the FPSC found that it should particularly encourage LECs to offer
information services.72 While the FPSC was concerned about LEC involvement
in information services, 7 the FPSC did not conclude that the market for
information services would be more competitive, innovative, or efficient if LECS
were excluded.
Third, the FPSC foresaw two dangers from LEC-provided information
services. One danger is shifting costs from information services to monopoly
services which causes rates for monopoly services to rise (cross-subsidies'). A
second, related danger is using the deep pocket of monopoly services to support
anticompetitive (predatory) pricing of information services. 74 The FPSC found
that the "nonstructural safeguards" adopted by the FCC in the Third Computer
Inquiy75 were inadequate, and that tariff regulation of LEC-provided information services was necessary.76
The FPSC clearly overlooked less burdensome regulatory methods to protect
against cross-subsidies and predatory pricing, and failed to consider the deterrent
to innovation it was creating. Two other methods could prevent rate increases
for monopoly services and predatory pricing without the resultant delays,
expenses, and deterrents to innovation associated with full tariff filings for
innovative services. The first method is the full rate case applicable to LECS'
basic telephone services. This type of proceeding involves examination of an

70.
Id. The benefits of competition compared to a natural monopoly approach for expanding
the availability of telecommunications capabilities and telecommunications-based information services
is subject to debate. See NTIA, supra note 11, at 818. See generally J. PANZAR, THM CONTNUING
ROLE FOR FRANCHISE MONOPOLY IN RuRAL TELEPHONY (NV. Univ. 1987); J. PANZAR, THE
ECONOMICS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCI'URE ENHANCEMENT

(NW.

Univ.

1990).

71.
FloridaOrder, Order No. 21815 at 21, 27 (F.P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1989). In fact, the goal of
minimal disruption for non-LEC providers led the FPSC to reject a change from flat rates to usage

based pricing for LEC services used by these providers. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Company argued that the flat rates were subsidized. The FPSC decided against increasing the
contribution toward LEC joint and common costs from services utilized by these providers. Id. at
33-34.
72.
Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 48.
74. Id.
75. The FCC's rules involved nondiscriminatory, unbundled interconnections (Comparably
Efficient Interconnection and Open Network Architecture), disclosure of information on network
services, protection of customer proprietary network information, and accounting rules for allocating
costs between basic and enhanced services. Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1010-11, 1026.
76. FloridaOrder, Order No. 21815 at 48 (F.P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1989). The FPSC's decision to
impose tariff regulation may be related to gaps in the record. The order states that the LECs opposed tariff regulation solely because the information services market is competitive, and the LECs
demonstrated no harm from tariff regulation of other competitive services or from future tariff
regulation of LEC-provided information services. Id at 49.
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LEC's total revenue requirement (rate base and expenses) for regulated services
as well as its allocations of costs to individual services. 77 Any substantial
attempt by a carrier to raise basic service rates to cover costs associated with
innovative services could be detected in a proceeding on basic service rates.
Then, such attempted rate increases could be disallowed and the innovative
services would have no impact on basic service rates. The FPSC has overstated
the likely impact of any innovative service on basic service rates during its first
year or two, while it is small. Similar audits would be effective in a regulatory
review to determine whether basic service rates should be lowered or whether
refunds should be made.
A second method would allow tariffs for innovative services to go into effect
quickly but subject to a possible later complaint investigation.78 If the
regulatory commission determines in the complaint investigation that the tariff
was unlawful, the carrier would have to withdraw the tariff, and refund any
overcharges to customers or impute higher revenues from this service. An
expeditious complaint process would deter unlawful pricing, and given the small
size of most initial offerings of innovative services, would adequately protect
consumers and competition 79 without delaying the introduction of new
capabilities.
Finally, the FPSC should be criticized for failing to recognize LECs as sources
of innovative information services, and not merely sources of information
services that duplicate those available from other providers. If LECs solely seek
to provide information services that were previously or simultaneously offered
by many other firms, then deterrents and delays for LECs hurts consumers only
if LECs are the most efficient providers. However, when LECs seek to provide
capabilities not available from other firms in the marketplace, deterring or
delaying innovative services by LECs through full tariff review will deprive
customers of new capabilities. The public interest in having innovative services
quickly available and in encouraging carriers to develop new capabilities warrants
some risk-taking by regulators when allowing LECs to price innovative services.
C. Touch-Tone Service in California
The CPUC's handling of touch-tone service in 198480 and 198981 illustrates

77.

See Petitions of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company for Rate Stabilization

Orders and Other Relief, Case No. 88-0069TL (F.P.S.C., Oct. 13, 1988).
78.
Some states allow this approach for competitive services offered by any carrier, and the

FCC allows this approach for services offered by nondominant carriers. See eg., ILL.

ANN. STAT.,

ch. 111 213, paras. 13-502, 13-506 (Smith-Hurd 1988); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for

Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 554,
577-82 (1983) C'Competitive CarierRulemaking Fourth Report and Order).
79.
See infra Section III. An up-front check on predatory pricing involves a showing with the
tariff filing that price exceeds long-run marginal cost.
80.
Application of General Telephone Co. of California, a Corporation, for Authority to
Increase Certain Intrastate Rates and Charges for Telephone Services; and Related Matters, Decision
No. 8407108 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18, 1984) C'1984 Ordee9.
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the problems that can arise from regulatory decisions to treat innovative services
as major sources of contributions for universal service programs.
Three facts about touch-tone service are necessary as background for this
discussion. First, touch-tone service is required to access many information
services and is increasingly viewed as a feature of telephone service that should
be universally available. 82 Second, a subscriber's use of touch-tone service as
compared to non-tone (including rotary dialing) actually saves an LEC oDsts
because touch-tone service reduces switch holding times while a caller is
dialingY Third, because touch-tone service has become a popular feature and
is priced as a "premium nonessential service," 84 it contributes a substantial and
growing amount of revenues to California LECs. For General Telephone
Company of California ("General"), this service generated revenues of about $7.3
million in 1984 and $21 million in 1 98 9 g
In 1984, General proposed to eliminate the charge for touch-tone service. The
CPUC instead increased the rate from 50 to 85 percent for various subscriber
classes. The CPUC refused to characterize touch-tone as an element of basic
service: "Rather, it is the optional threshold service needed for a host of other
optional enhancements and capabilities."8 The CPUC agreed with two of the

81.
Alternative Regulatory Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 70-72. See also
lWsconsin Bell, Docket 6720-TR-10 at 37-40 (WIS. P.S.C., Sept. 5, 1990) (directing Wisconsin Bell to
"make the transition to ubiquitous residential Touch-Tone capability as quickly as possible and to
recognize the right of individual customers to request and receive Touch-Tone service in the interim
without a service charge or monthly rate." However, this Commission retained Touch-Tone charges
for business lines and trunks in order to avoid raising rates for other services that would be necessary
to cover the lost revenues.).
82.
The California Intelligent Network Task Force recommended that touch-tone service be
part of a "package of specific network applications services deemed by law or regulation to be
essential in everyday life.. . ," and defined as an element of universal service. PACImC BELL's
REsPONSE TO THE INTELGEn Nn'WOrRK TASK FORCM RPORT at 23 (1987). The CPUC observed
in 1989:
Pacific [Bell] also submits that provision of free residential Touch Tone service would
enable all Californians to participate in the Information Age and thus aid in avoiding
the creation of an information rich/information poor society. Moreover, Pacific states
that businesses would be encouraged to develop new services that require the use of
Touch Tone, thus meeting our goals of encouraging technological advance and full
utilization of the network.
: .. Many customers also agreed with Pacifics view that residential use of Touch
Tone has increased to the point where it should be considered a basic service.
*:'As
'
the Intelligent Network Task Force reminds us, ordinary residents have an
increasing need for information services to be delivered by the local network.
AlternativeRegulatory Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 70-71.
83.
1984 Order,Decision No. 8407108 at 29 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18, 1984).
84. Id. at 30 ("optional threshold service").
85.
Id. at 29-30;AltemativeRegulatory Frameworks,107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)at 71. This
increaze in touch-tone revenues is attributable to higher charges (65 cents monthly for all subscribers
before 1984 raised to $1 for residential and $1.20 for business by 1989), greater penetration -of this
service, and more access lines served.
86.
1984 Order,Decision No. 8407108 at 30 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18, 1984).
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reasons for high touch-tone charges argued by Pacific Bell Telephone Company
("Pacific Bell"):8 (1) high touch-tone charges support the availability of
low-priced exchange service for those who do not need or want enhancement;
and (2) the charges are a contribution from those who want enhanced services
to partially defray the capital cost of new technology central office equipment
which facilitates them.? Accordingly, the CPUC raised charges for the
relatively new capability, thus, increasing its contribution to universal service
programs, but impeding network efficiency and access to information services.
Five years later, the CPUC faced a proposal by Pacific Bell to eliminate
touch-tone charges. Unlike its 1984 decision, the CPUC, in the 1989 Order,
accepted the argument that touch-tone is a necessary capability that should be
provided at no extra charge over basic service rates?8 However, in light of the
large revenue impact of this decision, the CPUC deferred eliminating this charge
until a supplemental rate design proceeding took place.9° As of October 1990,
the CPUC has yet to order this change.
The CPUC's experience with touch-tone service demonstrates three points
about innovative services. First, some innovative services offer capabilities that
subsequently become viewed as part of universal service goals. Because of the
initial low level of marketplace acceptance and regulatory inertia, it may take
several years after the service is initiated for regulators to accept the expanded
definition of basic service. Second, while an innovative service is growing and
has not yet been accepted as an element of basic service, there is an increasing
temptation for regulators to raise rates to help support universal service
programs. Third, the second point (high rates for a new capability) can interfere
with the first point (eventually treating the capability as part of basic service with
rates supported by universal service programs or based on marginal cost). It is
easier to expand the definition of basic service to include a capability that has
been priced at or near cost than a capability that has been making a large
contribution above cost.91
Regulators cannot be expected to perfectly identify, at the time of initial
offerings, which new capabilities eventually will become viewed as elements of
basic service. However, the possibility that any new capability will so evolve
provides regulators with a reason to refrain from pricing a new capability to
generate a large contribution for universal service programs. In the early years
of the innovative service, its contribution to universal service programs will be
small, regardless of the pricing, because of its low penetration in the marketplace. If market penetration grows, its potential contribution also grows, but so

88.

Id.
Id

89.

AlternativeRegulatwy Frameworks, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 71.

87.

90. Id. at 72.
91.
Regulators have to face the group of users who claim that they do not want the added
capability and benefit from the low basic service rates supported in part by high charges for that
capability. While many users would benefit from a reduced charge for the capability, this group
would pay higher rates for basic service.
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does the likelihood that the innovative service will become an element of basic
service which should not be priced far above marginal cost.
D. Price Cap Plan at the FCC
A final illustration of regulatory obstacles to innovative services appears in the
FCC's Orders which implemented price caps (or incentive regulation) for
AT&TV in 1989 and for certain LECs in 1990. 93 Price caps employ a broadbased formula reflecting economy-wide cost inflation adjusted for historic
industry-wide productivity gains and other factors to adjust a carrier's rates
annually so as to keep them just and reasonable over a multi-year plan. This
approach to ratemaking departs from the traditional focus on the carrier's actual
costs. The logic behind the change in ratemaking was to remedy the negative
aspects of the traditional cost-plus approach. In particular, cost-plus regulation
fails to provide the maximum incentives for carriers to pursue efficiency and
innovation, and invites prolonged accounting disputes as regulators attempt to
prevent cross-subsidies and unreasonable prices. In contrast, price caps provide
earnings incentives for carriers to cut costs and to introduce innovative services.
Also, price caps reduce both the incentives for, and the ability of carriers to
engage in, shifts of costs and revenues across services.9 4
The FCC's price caps apply an index for the weighted average rate of a
carrier's total regulated services (or baskets of services) as well as a band of
pricing flexibility to limit a specific service's price from one year to the next 95
Of concern here is how the FCC deals with the initial pricing of services in the
category it defines as "new." The FCC requires that prices for new services be
incorporated into price caps not at their introduction, but rather at the first
annual price cap tariff filing following completion of the base period in which
they are introduced. 4
The FCC lumps together in the category of new services those services which
offer new capabilities9 as well as repriced services which add options for
customers. 98 This decision is flawed and detracts from an overall commendable
regulatory reform. Besides being a lax approach to limitations on pricing
flexibility for innovative services that successfully grow, this approach will cause
excessive delays and initial cost support burdens.
To explain these shortcomings, new services are regulated in three phases
under the FCC's Order. First, initial prices are established by a net revenue
contribution test. This test reflects the costs caused by, and revenues from, a

92.
93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

FCC Price Caps, 4 F.CC. Rcd. at 3115-29.
LEC Price Caps, F.C.C. 90-314 (Oct. 4, 1990).
FCCPrice Caps, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. at 2907-13, 2922-33.
47 C.F.R. §§ 61.42-.49 (1989).
FCCPrice Caps,4 F.C.C. Rd. at 3116,3127-28; 47 C.F.R. §§ 61.42(d), 61A6(b) (1989).
Innovative services is the term used in this Article.
FCCPric Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 3116, 3123.
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new service as well as the service's impact on the costs and revenues of other
services. 99 The initial rate for a new service would be allowed to go into effect
if it is projected to increase a carrier's net revenues over about thirty-six months
after the offering goes into effect on a present value basis.'0° Generally, the
net contribution test allows lower rates for new services than the "fully
distributed costs" standard, 1 ' which had been used for all interstate rates prior
to 19 8 5 102 and is commonly applied by federal and state regulators to determine whether new rates for established offerings are cost justified. The net
revenue contribution test also allows, but does not require, rates above the fully
distributed cost standard. Traditional regulation generally would find such rates
unreasonably high and unlawful.1t 3
A carrier must support its net revenue projections with detailed information
about demand, cost, revenues, elasticity, and cross-elasticities. A full explanation
is required as to all assumptions, estimates, and cost allocation methods
employed. The FCC refuses to apply streamlined tariff review to new services.
Instead it requires a forty-five-day notice period "to determine whether a new
service raises issues of anticompetitive or discriminatory behavior or unjust and
unreasonable rates."1°4
The second phase of regulation continues until the service is incorporated into
price caps.'0 A carrier can refile rates, adjusted upward or downward without
limit as long as they satisfy the net revenue contribution test. Also, the carrier
must file quarterly reports comparing actual operating results with projections.
Finally, the FCC may require a change in the rate for a new service following an
investigation or complaint. 1' 6
The FCC's third phase of regulation incorporates the new service into price
caps. The FCC's rules provide for pricing flexibility for a specific rate in a band
of roughly five percent upward or downward per year around the average price
change. 1' 7 Greater adjustments are possible if the carrier shows "substantial
cause" for a higher rate or that a lower rate covers the services average variable
1°

cost.L

The FCC's rules are commendable in four ways. First, initial prices are set
with flexibility as long as they satisfy the net revenue contribution test. Prices

99.
This is called cross-elastic effects.
100. "The increase must be projected to occur within the lesser of the following time periods:
24 months from the incorporation of the service into an annual price cap filing, or 36 months from
the effective date of the service." FCC Price Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 3127; 47 C.F.R. § 61.49(g)
(1989).
101. J. BONBRIGTrr, supra note 40, at 480-89.
102. The FCC adopted the net revenue contribution test for certain types of offerings in 1985
in Optional Calling Plans. See Larson, Monson & Nobles, supra note 36, at 20-31.
103. J. BormRIGHT, supra note 40, at 109.
104. FCC Price Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 3127.
105. Id. at 3116.
106. Id. at 3127.
107. 47 C.F.Rt § 61A7(e)-(g) (1989); FCC PriceCaps, 4 F.C.C. Rod. at 3065-67.
108. 47 C.F.R. § 61.49(c)-(d) (1989).
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are not constrained to cover fully distributed costs or required to make a large
contribution to basic services, and an innovative service is not limited in its
potential to add to the carrier's total profits. Second, the rules provide a period
for rate adjustments by the carrier or the FCC in light of emerging demand and
cost conditions. Again, the net revenue contribution test provides a low floor
for the rate and gives the carrier pricing flexibility. Third, the carrier must file
quarterly reports to assist the FCC in monitoring a new service and in
determining whether the carrier has a strong record of predicting the demand
and costs for its new services. Finally, the price cap plan gives a carrier ongoing
profit rewards from innovative services that successfully grow. Consequently,
carriers will have more incentive to develop and market risky innovative
services.
However, the FCC rules for innovative services could have been improved
significantly if the FCC had distinguished innovative services (offering new
capabilities and small for the carrier at least in their initial years) from repriced
services. This distinction between services is not difficult to draw and is worth
the effort in terms of promoting innovation.
One improvement would flow from the fact that innovative services would have
little, if any, impact during the initial years on the demand and costs for the
carrier's other servces.0 9 Little is gained from considering future cross-elastic
effects for an innovative service with new capabilities. Also, multi-year
projections of demand and costs for an innovative service are likely to be highly
speculative, more so than the projections for a repriced service with established
capabilities. Accordingly, the FCC's multi-year net revenue contribution test
10
could be simplified for innovative services to a long-run marginal cost test.
Next, concerns about cross-subsidies, discrimination, or anticompetitive pricing
are far less serious for innovative than for repriced services. Some repriced
services will become large during their initial years. Furthermore, the loss to
consumers from delaying a service with new capabilities is likely to be greater
than that associated with a repriced service. Additionally, a headstart over
competitors is probably more important with an innovative service than with a
repriced service. For these reasons, the forty-five-day notice period for
innovative services should be shortened, perhaps to between one and fourteen
days. The complaint process would be available to address in further depth the
lawfulness of tariffs for innovative services.
A final point concerns the test for pricing innovative services after their
introduction. The FCC's order applies the net revenue contribution test as a
floor and does not apply a rate ceiling until the services are incorporated into
109.
110.

For a discussion of WACR, see Section II.A, supra.
See Kahn & Shew, supra note 40, at 225-26. Although certain different cost stan-

dards-long-run or short-run, marginal, incremental or average variable can produce somewhat

different results, this Article does not attempt to distinguish among them; considerations of
measurement problems and regulatory review as well as economic theory are relevant. See also I.
BONBRIGHT, supranote 40, at 410-77. Hereinafter, references to a long-run marginal cost test include

similar tests. Start-up expenses such as research, development, and introductory marketing costs
could be amortized in the calculation of such a cost standard.
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price caps. Afterwards, the FCC will not order a rate increase as long as the
rate covers the service's average variable cost, and will not order a rate decrease
as long as the rate is within the permissible band. This approach is reasonable
for innovative services subject to competition, where a carrier's pricing flexibility
is checked by market forces. But, other innovative services evolve from small,
discretionary and noncompetitive offerings to large, noncompetitive services, as
illustrated by touch-tone services. With the FCC's weak regulatory checks on
rates, carriers have substantial pricing flexibility for such services-permanently.
Regulators should not, even several years after introduction of a successful
innovative service, eliminate a carrier's profit incentive for innovation"' or
destroy a carrier's ability to adjust rates for changing market conditions.
Nevertheless, regulators should review innovative services which successfully
grow to a substantial size and should consider whether their rates are unreasonably high as well as whether the services make a sufficient contribution to the
carrier's basic service rates." 2 At some point, regulators should examine how
charges for a new capability relate to universal service programs-should these
charges help support basic service rates, or should they be lowered to support
greater market penetration of a capability which should be universally available?
III. REGULATORY APPROACH TO PROMOTE INNOVATIVE SERVICES

This Section explains a two-phase regulatory approach to promote innovative
services: a short-term framework and a long-term framework. As illustrated by
the recent regulatory decisions discussed in Section II, regulatory obstacles to
innovative services appear in several forms. Impediments arise in: (1) barring
an innovative service or an efficient network configuration for an innovative
service because of concerns regarding impacts on universal service programs and
established carriers;'" (2) requiring that the initial prices for innovative
services substantially exceed their marginal costs to help support universal
service programs and meet the carrier's overall revenue requirement;" 4 (3)
delaying the introduction of innovative services for full tariff review of cost and
demand projections, terms, and how the service is provided; 1 (4) requiring the
disclosure of competitively sensitive information, and the filing and review of
inherently speculative multi-year projections of demand and costs;116 (5)7
imposing unequal regulatory burdens on competitors' innovative services;"

111. As explained in Section III.B, infra, price caps can help achieve long-term incentives for
innovation better than traditional cost-based regulation.
112. In a price cap framework, the adjustment for contributions to basic services from innovative services which successfully grow can be made through the level of a "consumer productivity
dividend," i.e., annual downward adjustments to rates reflecting a presumed or targeted contribution.
FCCPrice Caps, 4 F.C.C. Red. at 3001-02.
113. Cellular WACR in North Carolina.
114. Cellular WACR in North Carolina and touch-tone service in California.
115. LEC-provided information services in Florida and new services at the FCC.
116. LEC-provided information services in Florida and new services at the FCC.
117. LEC-provided information services in Florida.
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and (6) failing to re-evaluate prices of innovative services as they grow to
determine whether they are too high (monopolistic or inconsistent with an
expanding definition of universal service) or too low (not making sufficient
contribution to universal service programs or the carrier's overall revenue
requirement).'
Many of these regulatory obstacles flow from the regulators' failure to
distinguish innovative from repriced services, as well as initial regulatory
treatment of each innovative service as though it is already a major market force
accounting for a large portion of the carrier's operations. The following
regulatory framework attempts to avoid these problems by limiting its application to innovative services which are expected to start out as a small part of a
carrier's operations, and by requiring periodic re-evaluations and adjustments to
regulations.
A Short-Term Framework
When an innovative service is introduced and while it remains small,
regulation should possess five characteristics: (1) expeditious effectiveness of
tariffs after filing; (2) filing requirements limited to a showing that rates cover
long-run marginal costs; (3) an incentive plan which allows the carrier to retain
profits derived from the innovative service; (4) complaint process for claims of
discrimination or predation; and (5) a reporting system to monitor demand, costs
and revenues.
1. Expeditious Effectiveness. New capabilities which the carrier makes available
to users through an initially small offering should not be delayed by long notice
periods (e.g., forty-five days or several months) or requirements of hearings.
Rather, initial tariff filings for innovative services usually should be allowed to
go into effect in fourteen days or less. Regulators could extend this period if:
(1) they found that the innovative service poses unusually controversial issues
(e.g., caller identification service);11 9 (2) the carrier shows that the rate covering
the service's costs is seriously deficient; or (3) the terms of the offering are
unlawful (e.g., restrictions on resale or bundling).
Four mechanisms would facilitate expeditious effectiveness of initial tariffs for
innovative services. First, carriers could apply previously approved general
methods for allocating costs to innovative services.'" Next, the carrier could
file monitoring reports. Third, a complaint process would be available for users,
competitors, or regulators to initiate proceedings for the purpose of scrutinizing
an offering in greater detail after it went into effect. Finally, the second phase
(long-run framework) would kick in if the service grew into a significant market
118.

New services at the FCC and, for several years, touch-tone service in California.

119.

See supra discussion in Section I.A.

120. See Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of Nonregulated
Activities, 2 F.C.C. Red. 1298, recon., 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 6283 (1987), further recon., 3 F.C.C. Red. 6701
(1988), aff'd sub nom. Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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force,1l to provide procedures for re-examining rates and terms of an initial
offering.
2 Cost Standards. The cost standard for an innovative service's initial tariff
should be limited to protecting against predatory pricing and cross-subsidies.12
A long-run marginal cost test would service this purpose? 3 Requiring a
carrier to price above this standard would suppress demand for an innovative
service, and perhaps deter a carrier from developing and introducing it. Also,
when a carrier faces unregulated or less heavily regulated competitors for the
service, requiring that the carrier charge a higher price could impair its ability
to compete. As a result, the carrier would be subject to less competition (higher
prices and less pressure to develop innovative features) and suffer lost revenues.
During the initial phase, regulators should not establish the maximum lawful
rate, such as one based on fully distributed cost. If the offering involves new
capabilities with unproven market acceptance, there would probably be
substantial price elasticity of demand. Consequently, the carrier has a strong
incentive not to set the initial rate unreasonably high. Any profits the carrier
earns from the service in this introductory phase are important incentives for
developing and introducing new capabilities. Subsequent adjustments to the rate
could be made if the service successfully grows and the capabilities become
viewed as a basic, noncompetitive service rather than as a discretionary or
competitive service.
During its first year or so, an innovative service would not make significant
contributions to universal service programs or to covering a carrier's common
costs. Nor would the innovative service divert substantial usage from large,
established services during this initial period. The introduction and early growth
of an innovative service should not be stymied by regulatory attempts to obtain
the same (and often poorly measurable) contribution to universal service
programs from new services as from the larger, established services. Nor should
innovative services be handicapped by regulatory rate-setting based on either
fully distributed costs with arbitrary allocations of common costs or by
speculative analysis of whether the demand and cost projections properly account
for cross-elastic effects on other services for several years into the future.
As for a cost-based floor on an innovative service's initial price, even a

121.

For a discussion of when this level occurs, see Section IILB, infra.

122. This component of the regulatory framework is unnecessary when a carrier faces
competition for all of its offerings. In that case, a carrier should not be burdened with cost
justification for tariffs and any concerns about predatory pricing should be addressed through the
regulatory complaint process and/or the antitrust laws. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Service and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1980);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1891 (1990) C'When a firm...
lowers prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the business lost by rivals cannot be viewed
as an 'anticompetitive' consequence of the claimed violation.'); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-91 (1986) (predatory pricing is rarely attempted); Town of Concord
v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (regulation reduces the risk of a price squeeze
creating anticompetitive harms).
123. See supra Sections I.B.2 and II.D.
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long-run marginal cost test depends on projections of costs and demand that are
likely to be speculative for an innovative service. The potential harm to
competitors and consumers from the initial rate possibly falling below long-run
marginal cost are small, especially if these are the less cumbersome tools of the
proposed complaint process, monitoring reports, and second phase reexamination. Accordingly, regulators should impose on carriers a light burden of proof
in supporting their projections.
3. ProfitIncentives. As an incentive for innovation, carriers should be allowed
to retain profits derived from innovative services during their introductory
period. Losses from innovative services should be borne by carriers symmetrically, rather than being offset by higher rates for established services. This can
be achieved through several approaches.
Under traditional rate regulation, innovative services during their initial period
could be treated as unregulated ("below the line') offerings; thus, their revenues
and allocated costs could not be considered in rate cases. As a variation on this
approach, profits as well as losses from innovative services would be considered
only when a carrier proposes to increase its rates for basic services. This
variation allows regulators to assure ratepayers that a carrier is not increasing
rates for basic services while reaping untapped profits from innovative services.
Under regulation providing for a sharing of earnings between ratepayers
(refunds) and the carrier's shareholders (retained earnings), earnings from
innovative services could be excluded from the sharing. The same treatment
could be used under regulation providing for full refunds to ratepayers of
earnings over a certain level or automatic rate adjustments. A less desirable
alternative would apply a low percentage for refunds to ratepayers (e.g., ten
percent) multiplied by high earnings from these services. Using this alternative,
any such showing of initial profits from innovative services would lessen
incentives for innovation and lead to accounting disputes over how these
earnings should be computed.'2
Under pure price cap regulation, profits from all services-whether established,
repriced, or innovative-are retained by the carrier. This form of regulation
achieves the desirable objective of providing profit incentives for innovative
services. However, any automatic downward adjustment to price caps should not
reflect a presumed contribution from innovative services during the initial
period. Such an adjustment would be unreasonable in light of the higher risks
of loss from innovative services during this initial period.
4. ComplaintProcess. The complaint process would back-up the streamlined
review of initial tariffs and give the "benefit of the doubtV to demand and cost

124. See Wisconsin Bell, Docket 6720-TR-10 at 92 (Wis. P.S.C., Sept. 5,1990) C'Establishing a
productivity.target based on a dollar amount... avoids the administrative difficulty and expense
associated with calculating and distributing shared earnings:).
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projections.' Also, the complaint process would function together with the
monitoring reports to document actual market experience as an innovative
service grows. For example, questions of discrimination in the use of a carrier's
other services, in the offering's availability to users, or in its rates could be
addressed through the complaint process. Similarly, estimates of demand and
costs could be examined more thoroughly during an administrative hearing if a
complainant can make aprimafacie showing that a rate falls below the carrierlong-run marginal cost. An administrative finding of unlawfulness would require
amendments to the tariff, withdrawing the offering, payment of compensatory
damages, or disallowance of certain costs from the revenue requirement for basic
services.
To be effective, the complaint process must move quickly.16 Even if the
initial tariff for an innovative service is later found unlawful, users, competitors,
or the carrier would suffer little harm from the short period during which the
tariff was effective.
5. MonitoringReports. Finally, the short-term regulatory framework should
require carriers to fie monitoring reports quarterly or semi-annually. Frequent
reports on the demand costs and revenues for innovative services would facilitate
regulatory review to determine whether the rates satisfy the cost standard,
whether a complaint and investigation is warranted, or whether a service is
growing so successfully that the initial phase is coming to an end. A carrier
could request confidential treatment of certain information.
B. Long-Term Framework
Regulations should clearly specify the factors that determine when a commission would change its regulatory approach from the short-term framework
described in Section III.A to the long-term framework explained in this Section.
This criteria could be based on a period after introduction of an innovative
service (one or two years) or a level of revenues shown by the monitoring
reports.tm
When an innovative service has successfully grown, four issues arise which
would not come into play under the streamlined approach of the short-term
regulatory framework. Should the service contribute to universal service
programs and the carrier's common costs like other services in order to support

125. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 555, 577 (1983) (Fourth Report and Order).

Regulatory commissions' complaint processes function through either hearings before an
administrative law judge (hearing examiner) or a paper record.
126.

47 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) (1990); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2[3, para. 13-502(b) (Smith-Hurd

1990).
127.

See Pacific Bell Fax SIF, Decision 90-07-052 at 19 (Cal. P.U.C., July 18, 1990) (allowing

innovative service to go into effect for one year under experimental framework); WACR Recon. Order,
Docket P-100, Sub. 109 at 5 (E.N.C.U.C., Oct. 10, 1990) (Unspecified level of future growth by an
innovative service that may warrant an adjustment to regulation.).
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reasonable rates for basic services and avoid uneconomic diversion of usage?
Are the services rates unreasonably high? Should some portion of the services
profits flow through to ratepayers? Should the service be encompassed within
universal service programs, such as by making the capability available to all
residential subscribers as part of basic local service?
The availability of a supplemental regulatory process for re-evaluating services
and their rates is critical to the reasonableness of a streamlined short-term
framework. The subsequent regulatory process should first address the threshold
issue of whether the service faces substantial competition from other providers.
If so, the service should be deregulated because additional regulatory burdens
would be inconsistent with and not viable in the marketplace. If substantial
competition does not exist, additional regulatory burdens may be in the public
interest. This Section describes the proposed long-term framework for
noncompetitive innovative services that successfully grow. Three parts are
discussed-rates, profits, and other terms.
1. Rates. The short-term framework applies a floor of long-run marginal cost
and no ceiling for rates. However, for an innovative service that successfully
grows, both a higher floor and a ceiling may be reasonable.
The higher floor would be justified based on two considerations both relating
to the size of the offering. First, rates for many other services include a
regulatory-imposed or regulatory-encouraged contribution to universal service
programs. A service which is a substantial component of the carrier's operations
and the marketplace without such a rate additive could divert usage from the
other services, which would lead to uneconomic impacts on network utilization
and undermine support for the universal service programs. Second, even without
substitution across services, a large innovative service nonetheless could make
a substantial contribution to universal service programs.
Nevertheless, concerns about rate additives remain in terms of inefficiently
suppressing demand for new capabilities and reducing carriers' incentives for
innovation. Any rate additive should be modest, and regulators should strive for
consistency in contributions from innovative services that successfully grow.
Consistency in this regard will promote more efficient decisions by carriers in
developing network configurations for and marketing their innovative services.
The new floor could reflect a specific charge applied to other services
(e.g., a universal service fund surcharge) or a fairly arbitrary adjustment to rates.
As for a rate ceiling, some regulatory check may be necessary where a service
has grown and competition is weak. Again, regulators should be sensitive to the
impact of rate adjustments on carriers' incentives to develop and introduce other
innovative services. The ceiling could be based on a loose profit test. For
example, under traditional rate of return regulation, earnings from the service,
calculated by using its fully distributed cost, should not exceed 500 basis points
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above a carrier's cost of capital1 9
2 Profits. The short-term framework has carriers retain all, or almost all, of
the profits as well as losses from innovative services. For services that
successfully grow, however, less of the profits should be retained by the carriers.
Under traditional rate regulation, the services could be treated along with
other regulated (above the line) offerings. With a shared earnings plan, a larger
percentage of high earnings would be refunded to ratepayers from these services
than from innovative services in their initial phase. Under pure price caps
regulation, a factor used to adjust prices downward above and beyond historic
productivity levels (a "consumer productivity dividend") could reflect a presumed
benefit from innovative services in this phase. m This adjustment to price caps
should be estimated to share such benefits between ratepayers, through lower
rates) and shareholders (through a reasonable prospect that innovative services
will raise a carrier's earnings above its cost of capital for providing just
established services).
The approach of traditional rate base/rate of return regulation is less desirable
than a shared earnings or price caps plan because it eliminates profits from
innovative services in this phase, and thus limits carriers' incentives for future
innovation. Regulation should not limit carriers' profit incentives for innovation
to the profits during the initial phase. Often, there will be no profits during that
period.
3. Other Terms. Finally, the long-term framework should deal with questions
of whether the capability is adequately available throughout the carrier's service

area and whether the capability should be incorporated in the basic local service
offering's rate. Regulators must be able to expand the definition of universal
service and accordingly adjust how new capabilities are offered. In examining a
carrier's rates for, and profits from, an innovative service in this phase, regulators
should also consider the demand for the service and how its capabilities relate
to use of other services. Consumer groups as well as carriers should be invited
to comment on the importance, availability, and options for pricing an offering.
CONCLUSION

Innovative telecommunications services are an important part of our economic
and social future. Thus, encouraging the development, introduction, and growth
of new capabilities should be an important regulatory goal. However, too often,
well-intentioned regulators impede the introduction of innovative services by
imposing excessive limitations, cost burdens, and delays.
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This Article has proposed a two-phase regulatory approach which promotes
innovative services while protecting other regulatory concerns. The first phase
streamlines regulatory obstacles to innovative service development to make new
capabilities quickly available to users. The second phase applies to innovative
services that successfully grow but remain noncompetitive. Regulations in the
second phase would be developed while the service is in the marketplace, and
would impose more limitations on rates, profits, and how the service is offered.
This two-step framework could readily be adopted by state regulatory
commissions and the FCC. In fact, many aspects of this approach already have
been applied. While this approach demands fewer administrative resources than
are typically applied by regulators to innovative services, it should substantially
increase the availability of innovative services to consumers. Policies aimed at
promoting advances in telecommunications networks and services should not
ignore the possible benefit of such regulatory reforms.
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